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espite broad support for long-term care financing reform, it is still not clear what shape reform will take. In 1987 approximately $33 billion o f the nation's health care expenses were devoted to nursing-home care for the elderly (Waldo et al. 1989, 117) . The Medicaid program, designed to cover the health care of the financially destitute, paid for more than a third o f these ex penses ($12 billion), while private finances covered most o f the rest ($19 billion). Only a fraction o f nursing-home expenses was covered through an insurance mechanism (either private or social insurance). The elderly also use significant amounts o f in-home long-term care services, and payment for these services is even more heavily dominated by out-ofpocket expenses. As the size o f the elderly population and the number requiring long-term care services continue to increase, there is a growing consensus that we need an alternative to a system that requires the el derly to pay for long-term care expenses out o f pocket until they are sufficiendy impoverished to qualify for Medicaid benefits.
Various groups and studies have called for reform in long-term care financing. Most recendy, the Pepper Commission proposed financing long-term care through an integrated program that would include a lim ited social insurance mechanism guaranteeing subsidized home-care benefits and three months of nursing-home care for every American, a public program for longer nursing-home stays with a floor of protection that guards against impoverishment, and measures that promote private long-term care insurance (U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehen sive Health Care 1990). The commission recommended that the social insurance part o f the program be fully financed by the federal govern ment, preferably through a broad-based progressive tax system. A recent study by the American Association for Retired Persons (1989) also en dorsed the idea of a social insurance program to pay for long-term care expenses. One of the conclusions of a major study by Rivlin and Wiener (1988) was that a social insurance mechanism is needed along with an expansion of the private insurance market. They based this conclusion on projections indicating that only a minority of the elderly could afford private long-term care insurance.
There is obvious resistance to long-term care financing reform that would require a new social insurance program or even an expansion of Medicaid. Proposals that involve increasing payroll taxes or general in come taxes in order to pay for a new benefit for the elderly do not seem feasible in a budget climate that already requires hard choices about re ducing current government expenditures. This climate, coupled with some sentiment that the elderly already have more than their fair share of government benefits, is not likely to produce wide support for a new program that covers long-term care expenses. Moreover, a new universal social insurance program covering long-term care expenses would bene fit middle-and upper-income elderly persons more than low-income persons because the Medicaid program already covers a large share of the nursing-home expenses o f poor elderly persons.
Nevertheless, some significant change in the way that long-term care is financed may be on the horizon. This solution involves the rapidly developing private insurance market for long-term care expenses. The Health Insurance Association o f America (1991a) recendy reported that, as of December 1989. more than 1.5 million long-term care insurance policies had been purchased, an increase of 400,000 policies (36 per cent) over 1988. The number o f insurers in the market is also increasing rapidly, and the quality o f the product is improving. In contrast to ear lier plans, most now offer some infladon protection for rising costs of nursing-home care, cover in-home care expenses, do not require prior hospitalization, and provide coverage for at least four years in a nursing home.
M 9
It is still not dear whether private insurance coverage can solve a sig nificant portion o f the long-term care financing problem. Until re cently, most of the elderly were not aware that they are not covered for long-term care services through Medicare, and we know that few of the elderly can afford today's long-term care insurance premiums (U.S. Bi partisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care 1990). The future contribution of this financing mechanism will depend on the popula tion's interest in long-term care insurance, as well as their ability to pay for the insurance without sacrificing other basic needs.
This study focuses on whether the profile of the elderly population is likely to change over time, so that long-term care insurance will become a more attractive and feasible option for a broader segment of the el derly population. Specifically, we examine two questions:
• What is the future need for long-term care services likely to be?
• Will long-term care insurance be affordable for a large portion of the future elderly population, or will it remain out of reach for most older Americans, suggesting that other solutions will be re quired?
The study uses dynamic microsimulation techniques to project the elderly population's characteristics, incomes, and long-term care needs between now and the year 2030. These techniques capture how the in teractions among changing demographics, disability levels, and income will determine the future long-term care needs o f the elderly. This methodology offers advantages over more traditional static aging tech niques, such as those used by the Census Bureau, because a large num ber of variables are endogenous to the model. Projections o f long-term care needs that rely primarily on Census age distributions for some fu ture year lead to an oversimplified picture of the future because nursinghome use is also related to marital status, living arrangements, and the availability o f caregivers (see, for example, Liu, McBride, and Coughlin 1990) . To the extent that there are significant changes in these determi nants of long-term care requirements, the more simplified models will under-(or over-) state the future need for long-term care.
A recent study by Rivlin and Wiener (1988) also used microsimula tion techniques to project the future need for nursing-home care. This study differs from theirs in that the behavioral content of the underly ing demographic and economic model is more complete, allowing us to simulate the profile of the elderly population further into the future and to incorporate more completely the effects o f recent behavior on the future profile of the elderly. In addition, the estimates presented here incorporate more recent changes in the still evolving long-term care in surance market.
Data and Methods
The Urban Institute's Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (DYNA-SIM) was used to project the characteristics o f the elderly population to the year 2030. DYNASIM is a microsimulation model that incorporates behavioral research on all o f the major demographic and economic events that will affect the future profile of the elderly. DYNASIM has its origins in the work o f Orcutt and others (1961) and has been under continuous development at The Urban Institute for more than 20 years (Lewis and Michel 1990) .
The dynamic projection methodology differs from the static aging tech niques used by the Census Bureau and the Social Security Administra tion in that it stimulates behavior at the personal and family levels. The model starts with a representative sample of the population. It "ages" the population in annual intervals through a series o f probabilistic mod els of the major demographic and economic events that affect the status of the family unit. The microsimulation methodology provides a power ful projection tool because births, deaths, labor force participation, and other economic and social events interart to shape the profile of the population.
The DYNASIM model is fully described elsewhere (see, for example, Orcutt, Caldwell, and Wertheimer 1976; Johnson, Wertheimer, and Zedlewski 1983, 1989; Congressional Budget Office 1986; Hacker and McBride 1989; and Zedlewski et al. 1990 ). Below we highlight the mod el's input data and the behavioral functions used to develop a profile of the future elderly population. We also define the aggregate projection assumptions used in this analysis.
In p u t D a ta
The starting data set used for this analysis is the " 1973 Exact Match File," which includes the March 1973 Current Population Survey (CPS),
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actual social security earnings records for each individual with work ex perience, and 1972 Internal Revenue Service tax return information. We begin the simulation process with this data set because it is the la t e s t available public use file that includes a representative sample o f the population and their earnings history back to 1951. Historical informa tion is critical for simulating retirement incomes for persons with work experience prior to the date o f the input file, because many retirement income sources (e.g., social security and pensions) are based on earnings histories. The DYNASIM model continues to build upon this historical data with each year o f simulation. More recent historical data are also built into the simulation process. Historical trends for each event simulated are used to guide the model's projections and to validate its predictions during the 1974-1988 period. These data include vital statistics on births, deaths, marriages, and di vorces, and data from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics on labor force par ticipation, hours worked, and real earnings growth.
The drawback of using the 1973 Exact Match File is that we must rely on simulated data for a larger part o f the projection period. However, we rely on the DYNASIM model to capture the interactions among these events over the [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period. In addition, we use historic ag gregate data to benchmark simulation results for the 1974-1990 period. These steps ensure accuracy of aggregate events, while also capturing some expected disaggregated effects.
Behavioral M odels
Dynamic aging relies on a set of behavioral functions used to update microunit characteristics year by year. These functions attempt to cap ture important and stable real world relationships so that the model will generate realistic samples representative of some future date. Thus, the model must capture movements o f demographic or economic aggregates (such as fertility, divorce, or female labor force participation) over time, as well as the important cross-sectional features o f behavior so that dis tributional outcomes can be examined. For example, it is not sufficient to simulate secular trends in the probability o f divorce over time. The model must also capture important variations in the incidence of divorce such as higher divorce rates experienced by couples in which the wife's earnings are relatively high compared with the husband's, and by couples in which the wife first married at an early age (Cherlin 1977) . Similarly, it is not sufficient to capture increasing female labor force participation over time; the model must also capture differences in participation by marital status, the number and timing o f children ever born, and the relative economic returns to work.
Development of realistic behavioral functions has been a major feature of DYNASIM (Wertheimer et al. 1986 ). DYNASIM's aging process con sists o f a set o f simulations of birth, death, divorce, marriage, educational attainment, labor force status, job change, wage rates, and unemploy ment. Table 1 lists the essential operating characteristics o f DYNASIM along with the variables that are endogenous to each o f the outcomes. As shown, the extent o f the interactions among social and economic variables that DYNASIM captures is fairly extensive.
As indicated in table 1, to project future retirement incomes, the model applies detailed sets of social security and private pension benefit rules to the simulated earnings and family histories. The sets of rules replicate benefit formulas in use today. In the case of social security they incorporate scheduled future changes. Other pension parameters are in dexed with real wages or prices as specified in different plan formulas. Projected marital histories are important to the retirement income simu lation because former or deceased spouses' retirement credits and bene fits are used to calculate surviving spouses' benefits.
DYNASIM also includes a number of health-related modules. Specif ically, the model predicts the number of limitations in activities of daily living (ADLs) that elderly persons "have difficulty performing" as a function o f a person's age, sex, current and previous marital status, race, and location, based on data representative o f the entire elderly popula tion in 1984 (McBride 1989) . In addition, the DYNASIM model pre dicts nursing-home entry as a function o f the elderly's health and demographic characteristics.
P rojection A ssu m p tio n s
The DYNASIM model can also capture the consequences o f alternative long-range aggregate assumptions about demographic and economic events. Aggregate outcomes can be constrained to match "consensus" views regarding the future paths o f key demographic or economic events. For these projections we followed the Social Security Administra tion's 1986 assumptions regarding future births, unemployment, and average real wage growth (see table 2 ). In the case o f mortality, how ever, we provide an alternative assumption. One mortality path follows Social Security's baseline assumption and the other follows their more optimistic projection. In the optimistic projection, mortality rates de cline at historical rates; in the middle-of-the-road projection, mortality rates decline at half this rate. It must be noted, however, that even though some of DYNASIM's a g g re g a te results may be constrained to match key assumptions regarding future events or sectoral change, the model's internal behavioral func tions distribute the incidence of events at the microlevel. For example, we track particular mortality rates (for different sexes), but an individ ual's re la tiv e probability o f death will vary according to factors included in the model (e.g., education, marital status, age, sex, race). A variety o f changes in the demographic profile o f the future elderly population will affect their need for formal, long-term care services in nutsing homes (or significant levels o f in-home services provided by pro fessionals). Obviously, the life span o f the elderly and the proportion who have health limitations will be important because the need for long-term care, in general, increases with age and disabling health con ditions. Their living arrangements will also be important, however. If more elderly persons live alone in the future, the demand for formal inhome and nursing-home services will increase (holding constant health and other characteristics) because fewer elderly will be living with family caregivers providing significant levels of informal long-term care services. Table 3 highlights expected changes in several key demographic factors that will affect the need for long-term care services in the future. We show the age composition of the elderly population, fertility history of women retiring in the twenty-first century, and their future living ar rangements. We refer to these as demographic "risk" factors because the need for fo r m a l long-term care services is most acute for persons who are very old, have no living children, and are living alone. These results illustrate that the size of the frail elderly populationpersons aged 85 and older-will be very sensitive to mortality trends. If the optimistic mortality assumptions hold, there will be 12 million frail elderly in 2030, compared with 8.7 million in the baseline projection, a difference of 38 percent. Given that Social Security's baseline projec tions have historically been too pessimistic, policy makers must seriously consider the implications o f the more optimistic mortality scenario (Guralnik, Yanagishita, and Schneider 1988) .
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Changing D em ograph ic Risk Factors
Table 3 also illustrates that there will be fewer adult children avail able to care for elderly parents in the future. Among women aged 65 in 2010 (born prior to the baby-boom cohort) only 10.6 percent will be childless, compared with 18.5 percent o f women reaching age 65 in 2030 (born in 1965). As shown, the average number of children born to women will be significantly lower for cohorts o f women retiring after 1990.
The last demographic risk factor shown, the number of elderly living alone, also leads us to expect far greater growth in the demand for for mal long-term care services in the future than the sheer size of this pop ulation might indicate. These projections show dramatic increases in the number o f elderly living alone in the future (table 3) . Almost 26 mil lion elderly persons will live alone in 2030 under the baseline assump tions, compared with 10 million in 1990, an increase far in excess of the general increase in the elderly population.
These projections take into account not only changing marital status patterns among the elderly, but also the increasing propensity of nonmarried elderly to live alone. The baby-boom cohort has experienced lower marriage rates and higher divorce rates than their predecessors, and fewer of them are likely to be married during retirement, all else being equal (Bloom and Bennett 1985) . In addition, the increasingly strong preference of the elderly to live alone, their growing financial indepen dence, the dwindling availability o f children as cohabitants, will increase the proportion of unmarried (single, widowed, and divorced persons) persons living alone (King 1988) .
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D egree o f D ep en d en cy
The health characteristics o f the future elderly population will interact with demographic characteristics to determine the need for nursing-home care. Table 3 shows DYNASIM's forecasts o f the number o f elderly likely to need nursing-home care under the two mortality scenarios, and it shows the number of elderly living in the community with health limitations.
Assuming that recently observed entry patterns continue into the fu ture, the number o f elderly persons needing care in nursing homes will increase from about 1.8 million today to 3-3.4 million in 2010 and to 4.3-5.3 million in 2030, depending on the mortality rate assumption. Thus, the need for nursing-home care could nearly triple from 1990 to 2030, despite the fact that the elderly population will only increase by 125 percent over the same period under the optimistic mortality rate projection. Table 3 also indicates the number of elderly living in the community with health limitations using an index that measures the number of el derly who have difficulty with one or more of the following ADLs: eat ing, dressing, bathing, going to the toilet, and transferring. The number of unmarried elderly experiencing difficulty with ADLs in creases from 3-1 million persons to 6.4 million in 2030, indicating a po tentially large increase in the need for in-home services.
We expect that these trends will increase elderly persons' awareness of the risk o f needing long-term care support. The p ro p o rtio n of the el derly needing nursing-home care will expand most significandy between 1990 and 2010 (from 5.7 percent to more than 7 percent o f the elderly population) because the proportion o f the elderly who are very old, un married, and with health limitations will increase faster during this pe riod. Another 15 percent o f the elderly will be living in the community with health limitations, and most o f these will not have a spouse to care for them. Furthermore, the n u m b er o f elderly requiring long-term care services will continue to increase after 2010 as the size of the elderly population continues to grow. When the baby boom population reaches their very senior years (in the 2040s, beyond these projections), the p ro p o r tio n o f elderly needing long-term care services will again increase.
Will More of the Elderly Be Able to Afford Long-term Care?
The ability of the elderly to pay for long-term care will depend crucially on their economic status in the 1990-2030 period, the future cost of nursing-home care, and the type o f mechanisms available to finance care. This section examines expectations about future growth in retire ment income of the elderly, and estimates whether the future elderly will be better able than their predecessors to afford the cost o f long-term care. O f course, real growth in the incomes of the elderly will have to outpace significantly the growth in the cost of nursing-home care to im prove the current affordability picture because the cost of nursing-home care currendy exceeds the incomes of most elderly persons.
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The DYNASIM projections show that real postinflation incomes o f the elderly will rise significantly between 1990 and 2030, but income growth will be uneven among subgroups o f the elderly population and across time (table 4). Particularly strong growth in retirement income is expected for the "young elderly" (persons aged 65 to 69) in 2010. These persons represent the cohort born between 1941 and 1945, the genera tion just prior to the baby boomers. This cohort benefited from the strong economic growth in the 1960s U.S. economy during the begin ning of their careers, and they were well established by the time the eco nomic difficulties of the post-1973 economy began (Levy and Michel 1991) . Table 4 shows, for example, that incomes for married couples, aged 65 to 69 in 2010, will be 63 percent higher than the incomes of married couples in 1990. Incomes for unmarried men will increase by 76 percent during this period, and incomes for unmarried women will in crease by 59 percent. Real incomes for married couples and for unmarried men aged 70 to 79 are also significantly higher in 2010 than in 1990 for similar reasons. Real income increases by 60 percent for married couples and by 55 per cent for unmarried men. Persons in this cohort, many of whom were parents o f the baby-boom generation, economically outperformed suc ceeding and preceding cohorts, often by substantial margins. In con trast, real incomes for unmarried women in this age group only grow by 36 percent over the 1990-2010 period. This generation of women did not participate in the labor force as fully as their successors and thus did not benefit from the favorable economic and pension conditions as much as men. Table 4 also shows that the projected increases in income for the young elderly between 1990 and 2010 will have an enormous impact 20 years later when this generation reaches their eighties. For example, real median income for elderly married couples aged 80 and older will be 80 percent higher in 2030 than in 2010; income for unmarried men aged 80 and older will increase by 69 percent, and income for unmarried women aged 80 and older will increase by 58 percent.
After 2010, however, the growth in income for young elderly persons is likely to be slower. Married couples aged 65 to 69 in 2030 will have incomes about 42 percent higher than their predecessors in 2010, and unmarried men's incomes will only be about 24 percent higher. This co hort, born in the early 1960s, entered the labor force after 1973 during years o f sluggish growth or at least growth rates not as high as the 1960s. They will also be the first to experience the f u l l effects o f the 1983 So cial Security Amendments, which will gradually increase the age at which full retirement benefits are available. The current retirement age of 65 will begin to increase in the year 2000 until it reaches age 67 in
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2022. Benefits for persons retiring before age 67 are expected to be about 12.5 percent lower than they were for preceding cohorts retiring at the same age (Bernstein 1990) . Moreover, the increase in the retire ment age is not expected to substantially reduce the proportion of the elderly who retire early (Fields and Mitchell 1984) . The DYNASIM pro jections incorporate these changes and show that the amendments will significandy reduce social security benefits.
The 48 percent growth in retirement income for unmarried women aged 65 to 69 during the 2010-2030 period is still relatively strong, however. The effects of increased labor force participadon of women and changes in pension regulations during the 1970s influence these re sults. That is, more women will retire with substantial pensions and with significantly higher social security benefits because o f their in creased labor force participation and these effects mitigate the reduction in retirement income due to the 1983 amendments.
Despite the real growth in retirement incomes over the 1990-2030 period shown here, the average rate of income growth for the elderly will, in general, be slower than that experienced by their predecessors. men are very similar to historic increases, however. For women, the pace o f growth between 1990 and 2010 is significantly below the historic rates shown, but the rapid rate o f income growth for this group is re stored in the 2010-2030 period. It must be noted, however, that the growth in income for the elderly during the 1967-1984 period was un usually strong, primarily because of federal policy changes designed to alleviate poverty among the elderly, and a surge in private pension ben efits and real interest rates (Burkhauser and Duncan 1988; Zedlewski et al. 1990 ). Thus, the future growth in income for the elderly would not be expected to match this pattern.
A ffo rd a b ility o f N u rsin g-hom e Care
Although the elderly population will be in a better financial position than their predecessors, it is not clear whether this means that more will be able to afford nursing-home care. The cost of nursing-home care ex ceeds the incomes of the vast majority of today's elderly. Whether or not the proportion of elderly who can afford to pay for long-term care expenses out o f pocket will increase depends on whether the income growth o f the elderly will significandy exceed the real increase in the cost of nursing-home care. In 1990 the estimated annual cost o f care in a skilled nursing-home facility was about $24,300 (American Association for Retired Persons 1989). Assuming that the cost of this care will increase with real wage rates, the average annual cost of nursing-home care (in 1990 dollars) will increase 34 percent between 1990 and 2010 (to about $32,600 in 2010) and an additional 33 percent between 2010 and 2030 (to about $43,500 in 2030) . Figure 2 compares the per person, real median incomes of the elderly with these projections o f nursing-home costs. Despite the sub stantial growth in income expected for the elderly, only 10 percent of the elderly will be able to finance the cost of nursing-home care out of their incomes in 2030 ( figure 2A) . However, the percentage of nursinghome costs that could be financed out of the incomes of the elderly will increase. In 1990, for all elderly the ratio of median income to nursinghome costs was only 0.37, but by 2030 the ratio will increase to 0.47 ( figure 2B ).
These projections suggest that most o f the future elderly will not es cape the financial risk o f long-term care. The problem will be especially acute for unmarried women, whose median income will cover barely one third o f nursing-home costs. Many of the elderly will continue to be forced to spend down assets until they can qualify for means-tested gov ernment coverage o f long-term care services. Those who live in states without medically needy programs may find themselves unable to qual ify for Medicaid because many are likely to have real incomes above their states' income eligibility limits. In summary, the financial catastro phe that long-term care presents today will not be eliminated on the ba sis o f a change in the income picture o f the future elderly.
A ffo rd a b ility o f L ong-term Care Insurance
Although increasing real income will not enable most of the elderly to finance nursing-home care out of pocket, it would improve their ability to finance a larger share o f these expenses. More important, increasing real incomes, coupled with growing awareness o f the potential financial catastrophe of long-term care expenses, may increase their interest in other financing mechanisms. Specifically, more may consider the advan tages of risk pooling and purchase long-term care insurance. O f course, the viability o f long-term care insurance as a financing option will de pend on the ability o f the elderly to pay for insurance premiums. Current long-term care insurance premiums can be projected and compared with incomes o f the elderly to assess the affordability of long term care insurance. This requires making assumptions about the cost of long-term care insurance premiums and the "affordability" of long-term care insurance. That is, how much of their incomes could the elderly be expected to devote to long-term care insurance? It is important to note that these projections do not assume that the elderly will consume their assets in order to pay for long-term care insurance. However, this would be an unlikely scenario if the future elderly conserve their assets during retirement like their predecessors (Hurd 1987) . Moreover, for reasons discussed earlier, many analysts expect that the future elderly popula tion, particularly the baby-boom generation, will own considerably fewer assets in real terms than their parents (Levy and Michel 1991)- To project insurance affordability, we use a composite of the 13 most popular long-term care insurance policies sold today, as described in the survey by the Health Insurance Association o f America (HIAA 1991a). These plans can be characterized as follows:
T ype o f p o lic y :
The plan covers the cost of a nursing-home bed (at a cost o f $80 per day in 1990 dollars and at least some inflation protection) for up to four years, and in-home services for up to eight years.
C o st o f cov erage a t a g e 6 5 :
The 1990 cost of this type o f policy, purchased individually at age 65, was $1,400, and $1,100 if the coverage was purchased through a group policy (HIAA 1991a). We assume that premiums for persons reaching age 65 in subsequent years will increase because nursing-home costs will rise as real wages in the economy increase. Real wage growth (shown in table 2) will increase premiums by 34 percent between 1990 and 2010 and by 33 percent between 2010 and 2030. 3. P urch ase a g e : In these simulations, we assume that each individ ual would evaluate the purchase of insurance at age 65. Long-term care insurance premiums are assumed to remain constant over an individual's life span, but " affordability" is reevaluated during the retirement period. Real income and, therefore, insurance afford ability, can decline during retirement because not all sources of in come are fully indexed. (Note that affordability estimates are not provided for persons aged 70 and older in 1990 because coverage of the type described here was not available when they reached age 65.) 4. A ffo r d a b ility : We assume the elderly can afford long-term care coverage if the premium is less than or equal to 5 percent of in come. To allow for sensitivity analysis, however, we also present two alternative income thresholds: 2.5 percent and 7.5 percent.
To project affordability, we compute the ratio of the assumed pre mium for the policies described above to the incomes of the elderly in the 1990-2030 period. We take for granted that the long-term care in surance policy is affordable only if the resulting ratio is less than the as sumed affordability ratio (e.g., 2.5 percent, 5 percent, or 7.5 percent). Note that we do not assume that individuals will necessarily purchase these policies; we only provide estimates of the percentage of elderly who could a f f o r d to purchase a policy. Table 5 shows the simulation results using the 5 percent affordability threshold and two premium assumptions: purchase of insurance individ ually, and purchase through group policies. In 1990 only 6 percent of the elderly in the 65-69 age category could afford individually pur chased long-term care insurance. The proportion of this age group who can afford such insurance using 5 percent of their incomes almost dou bles between 1990 and 2010-from 6 to 11 percent-the obvious result o f rapid increases in income expected for this group during this period. The slowing o f income growth for this group in the 2010-2030 period, however, results in only a 3-percentage point increase in the proportion of the population that will be able to afford long-term care coverage.
As would be expected from the income disparities discussed earlier, long-term care insurance is more affordable for married couples than for singles (even though married couples must purchase two policies). How ever, differentials in affordability narrow between 2010 and 2030 be cause the incomes o f single elderly persons are expected to rise faster than the incomes o f their married counterparts. Whereas women make some gains in their ability to pay for long-term care insurance premi ums, under the individually purchased premium assumption this type of insurance is still unaffordable for most of them. The lower-cost group-insurance premium assumption portrays a rosier picture for financing long-term care through a private insurance mecha nism. The percent of the young elderly who can afford group premiums with no more than 5 percent of their incomes rises to 19 percent in 2010 and to 23 percent in 2030 from about 10 percent in 1990. Almost a quarter of all elderly married couples and single men would be able to afford group long-term care insurance in 2030. The extent to which this scenario presents a realistic picture o f the future will depend on either increasing worker demand for group policies or declining insurance pre miums as insurers' risks become spread over a larger participating group. A more mature long-term care insurance market could also result in lower premiums if more insurers compete in the market.
It is also important to consider alternative affordability thresholds. Some elderly may be willing to spend a higher proportion of their in comes on insurance, whereas others may consider 5 percent a burden on their family budget. In fact, the 5 percent assumption represents a rela tively high budget share for insurance. For example, in 1987, middleincome ($15,000 to $30,000) families headed by a retired individual aged 62 to 74 spent about 9 percent o f their incomes on all health care spending, including about 4 percent for health insurance (Moehrle 1990) . Table 6 shows the results using alternative income affordability thresholds. The first shows the percentage of elderly whose insurance premiums cost less than 7.5 percent of income, and the second shows the percentage of elderly whose insurance premiums cost less than 2.5 percent of income. The higher budget share results show that over 26 percent of the elderly could individually purchase long-term care insur ance in 2030. A significantly higher percentage-44 percent-would be able to afford the lower-cost group premium for long-term care insur ance. On the other hand, the lower budget share results (less than 2.5 percent o f income) show that only about 4 percent of the elderly could afford insurance in 2030, even assuming the insurance would be avail able at the lower-cost group premium price.
C onclusions
Demographics, health, and income trends will interact to increase the demand for nursing-home care faster than many now realize. Whereas the number o f elderly will increase by 100 to 125 percent by 2030, the number requiring nursing-home care will triple during the same period. Marital patterns and fertility histories o f recent generations o f Americans will shape a future elderly population that is more likely to be living alone and less likely to have family caregivers. Thus, more will require formal, professional long-term care services to substitute for substantial family caregiving services. The need to find alternative long-term care financing arrangements will be acute. Our baseline projections o f the number o f elderly requir ing nursing-home care, and relatively conservative assumptions about the cost o f nursing-home care in the future, imply that annual expendi tures for nursing-home care will increase from about $44 billion in 1990 to $98 billion by 2010 and to $187 billion by 2030. Thus, although the number of elderly in nursing homes will increase by two-thirds between 1990 and 2010 (from 1.8 to 3.0 million, as shown in table 4), nursinghome expenses will more than double (from $44 billion in 1990 to $98 billion in 2010). These estimates imply faster increases in nursing-home spending than those reported by Rivlin and Wiener (1988) , primarily because the DYNASIM methodology projects a faster increase in the population at risk for nursing-home use. Over the 1990-2030 period, the need for nursing-home care will increase by 138 percent (4.3 million persons compared with 1.8 million in 1990), but nursing-home expen ditures will increase by 325 percent (to $187 billion) because the real cost of nursing-home care will also be increasing.
Current prospects for the financing of long-term care through alter native public sector programs seem bleak. After a decade of large bud get deficits, many feel it is unlikely that policy makers will consider increasing public expenditures by the amounts projected here. Given this situation, it is likely that private-sector solutions for long-term care financing will continue to receive attention.
However, this study suggests that private financing of long-term care through the types o f insurance mechanisms available today will be diffi cult. These projections confirm an emerging picture that, although the economic status o f the elderly will improve over the next four decades (see, for example, Easterlin, MacDonald, and Macunovich 1990) , pri vate financing o f nursing-home care will still not be a viable option for many o f the elderly. Very few o f the elderly will be able to personally fi nance nursing-home care out o f pocket, and the type of long-term care insurance policies prevalent today-privately purchased insurance with four years o f coverage for a nursing-home stay-will not be a viable op tion for most of the elderly. Its viability is restricted because the ex pected cost o f premiums will still represent a significant proportion of the incomes o f the future elderly. Using our best-educated guesses about the course o f future events, we estimate that only about 10 per cent of the elderly will be able to purchase a fairly generous individual long-term care insurance policy at a cost o f less than 5 percent of their incomes in 2030. Under more optimistic assumptions that the expansion of the long-term care insurance market will lead to lower premiums or that lower-priced group insurance policies will become more common, the proportion of the elderly who could afford insurance only rises to 18 percent.
These findings generally seem to confirm those reported by Rivlin and Wiener (1988) using a microsimulation technique. Although results are not direcdy comparable (the Rivlin and Wiener projections focus on four-year average profiles rather than single-year projections and the forecast periods o f the two studies differ), we can make some general comparisons. The DYNASIM projections suggest that the future elderly population, especially persons aged 80 and older, will be better-off eco nomically than the Rivlin and Wiener study. For example, Rivlin and Wiener (1988, 39 ) project a median income o f $8,000 for persons aged 85 and older in 2016-2020 (in 1987 dollars) , whereas the DYNASIM median income projection for persons aged 80 and older is $20,800 in 2030 (in 1988 dollars). However, the 1990 premiums used in this study are significandy higher than those used in the Rivlin and Wiener simu lation. Both studies reach the conclusion that the type of privately mar keted comprehensive long-term care insurance policy available today will be affordable only for upper-income elderly persons (using a 5 per cent of income affordability assumption).
Thus, policies that reduce the cost o f long-term care insurance are urgendy needed. These policies might include tax incentives that would effectively reduce the cost o f long-term care insurance to individuals and businesses. Insurance regulation that would require insurers to provide partial protection to those who have to drop policies during retirement may also be needed to increase the number of elderly willing to pur chase these policies. Increased participation should reduce the cost of premiums as the risk for long-term care is spread over a larger segment of the elderly population. And policies that make the insurance option more attractive for the elderly may also decrease the age at which premi ums are purchased, thereby reducing the annual cost o f premiums dur ing the retirement period. Policies that focus on alternatives to our current long-term care service delivery system may also be helpful. For example, more efficient and less expensive home care services that would substitute for nursing-home care could reduce insurers' expected payouts, thereby reducing the cost of insurance premiums. In short, the viability o f private long-term care financing will depend on innovative policies that reduce the cost of long-term care insurance because only a minority of elderly persons will be able to afford the types of compre hensive policies marketed today.
L im ita tio n s o f This S tu dy
The projections presented here provide our best estimates of the num ber of elderly who could afford to purchase insurance coverage for long term care. However, it is important to note that these estimates are based on a simulation model predicting 40 years into the future. The obvious limitations to these types of models serve as a caveat to the re sults presented here. For example, we noted earlier that nursing-home entry is predicted on the basis o f recendy observed entry patterns. Thus, the projecdons implicitly assume that the supply or demand for nurs ing-home care will be constant over time, given an individual's demo graphic and health profile. To the extent that the entry into nursing homes can be delayed through more in-home services or altemadve liv ing arrangements, these projecdons will overstate the number in nursing homes. Even in this case, however, it is likely that significant finan cial resources will still be required to maintain the elderly in altemadve settings.
Microsimulation model results provide estimates of the implications o f current demographic and economic trends on the future needs of the elderly, assuming a continuation o f current policies affecting long-term care. As such, future changes in the delivery and financing of long-term care would affect the affordability estimates provided here. More study is needed to understand the evolving market for long-term care insur ance. Although these policies have improved in recent years, policies may become more restrictive and premiums may increase considerably when insurance companies are forced to provide benefits for current pol icy holders. Moreover, little is known about the decision to purchase long-term care insurance by the elderly. Whereas our study provides projections o f the number o f elderly who c o u ld afford to purchase insur ance, we need to understand what types o f people are likely to purchase coverage before an assessment of the viability o f private options for fi The C hanging P rofile o f th e Elderly 2-73 nancing long-term care can be made. Finally, more research is needed to assess whether the elderly will be able to use their assets to pay for long term care in the future. Although it is not clear at all whether the asset position of the elderly will improve in the future, it is even less clear how the elderly use their assets to pay for their long-term care needs.
